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COMMENTS
DONATIONS A CAUSE DE MORT: A CIVILIAN SOLUTION TO
CHARACTERIZATION OF GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS THAT
ELUDE DONATIVE CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE
Introduction
The Louisiana Civil Code, like its French counterpart, recognizes
only two methods of making gratuitous dispositions, the donation inter
vivos and the donation mortis causa.' The Code defines a
donation inter
2
vivos (between living persons) as an act in prescribed form 3 "by which
the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given, in
favor of the donee who accepts it." 4 A donation mortis causa (in contemplation of death) is defined as an act which takes effect "when the donor
shall no longer exist, by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his
property, and which is revocable." 5 Additionally, a donation in contemplation of death is valid only if made by last will or testament. 6 Notwithstanding the strictures of the Code's donative scheme, Louisiana acknowledges the validity of gratuitous designations of beneficiaries in United
States Savings Bonds, 7 life insurance policies, annuity policies and pen1. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1467. Cf. Code Napol6on art. 893 (1804).
2. Although defined as an "act" in article 1468, a donation inter vivos is
essentially a gratuitous contract that is perfected by the acceptance of the donee.
Once properly accepted, the contract is irrevocable, except for cause. See La. Civ.
Code arts. 1559-69.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1536 provides that the donation inter vivos of an
immovable or an incorporeal shall be by act passed before a notary public and two
witnesses "under penalty of nullity." Article 1538 liewise subjects the donation
inter vivos of a movable to the formal act requirement of article 1536. However,
article 1539 excepts from the formality requirement the manual gift of a corporeal
movable, provided it is accompanied by actual delivery. For a discussion of this
exception, see Comment, Manual Donations of Obligations, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 602
(1935).

Historical development of the form requirement for donations inter vivos is
discussed in Martin, Natural Obligations, 15 TUL. L. REV. 497, 501-04 (1941).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1468, as amended by La. Acts 1871, No. 87.
5. Id. art. 1469.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1570 provides in pertinent part: "No disposition mortis
causa shall henceforth be made otherwise than by last will or testament. Every

other form is abrogated ...

" Rules for the requisite formalities of testaments are

found in Civil Code articles 1574-1604.

7. Louisiana is required to recognize the designation of a beneficiary in a
United States Savings Bond as a valid method of gratutious disposition by virtue of
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sion benefit plans, even though such designations, unlike donations inter
vivos, are not in solemn form and are almost always revocable, 8 and
unlike donations mortis causa, are not made by last will or testament.
Since these gratuitous designations of beneficiaries in donative plans
and policies elude both the mode and form of donations authorized by the
Code, they create difficulty with respect to Louisiana's laws on forced

heirship. In order to acquire his 16gitime, 9 a forced heir has an action for
reduction of donations, 10 "whether inter vivos or mortis causa," ' I that
exceed the disposable portion of the decedent's estate. I2 To ascertain what
reduction is appropriate, an active mass of the succession is formed by
adding to the assets the decedent owned at death all "property disposed of
by donation inter vivos"' 13 (the process of aggregation). Therefore, in
every potential case of infringement on the forced portion, it is essential to
classify the allegedly excessive gratuitous disposition in order to determine
if it is a "donation" properly subject to inclusion in the formulation of the
active mass of the succession and to the action for reduction. In the
instance of the gratuitous designation of a beneficiary in a life insurance
policy, Louisiana courts, with eventual legislative approval, 14 early
branded the disposition sui generis, rather than a donation subject to the
Code's process of aggregation and remedy of reduction, and uniformly
the supremacy of the federal treasury regulations governing bonds as against state
donative law. See note 63, infra.
8. One may, of course, designate an irrevocable beneficiary in a life insurance
policy, annuity policy or pension benefit plan, provided that such designation is
permissible under the respective policy or plan.
9. Provisions establishing the institution of forced heirship and regulating the
calculation of the legitime and disposable portion are found in Civil Code articles
1493-95. See Seccession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880); Clarkson v. Clarkson,
13 La. Ann. 422 (1858); 11 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 679 (6th
ed. Esmein 1954) in C. LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 679 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as AUBRY ET RAU]; The Work of the LousianaAppellate Courts
for the 1967-1968 Term-Successions and Donations, 29 LA. L. REV. 193, 194
(1969) (wherein 16gitime is defined as that part of a succession that is "essentially
inalienable, for it is protected against gratuitous dispositions inter vivos or mortis
causa, and more emphatically, because the gratuitous alienation thereof to the
detriment of forced heirs is expressly prohibited. Thus, the right to the legitime has
always been recognized as a right of succession .
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1504.
11. Id.
12. Id. arts. 1502-05. Although perfected by acceptance, the donation inter
vivos is nevertheless subject to the implied resolutory condition that, should it at
the donor's death prove to exceed the disposable portion of the estate as then
ascertained, it will be reduced to the extent of such excess.
13. Id. art. 1505.
14. LA. R. S. 22:647(A) (1958); id. 22:1521 (Supp. 1958).
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have permitted this donative device to defeat the right of the forced heir to
his lgitime. 15 But, with respect to gratuitous designations of beneficiaries
in United States Savings Bonds, annuity policies and pension benefit
plans, the judiciary has not been consistent in characterizing the dispositions, labelling bonds variously donations inter vivos 16 or mortis causa,17

denominating benefit plans contractual designations 18 or valid gratuitous
dispositions,' 9 and electing not to classify annuity policies at all,20 although the beneficiaries of all such designations have been deemed accountable to forced heirs.
This comment intends to show that the aforesaid gratuitous designations of beneficiaries escape the Code's donative characterization, and
instead should be classified as donations c6cause de mort. This denomination would effectuate uniform treatment of the designations and provide

meaningful protection to the fundamental, constitutionally guarded rights
of forced heirs under Louisiana's legal order.
HistoricalBasis of the Donation i Cause de Mort
Roman Law
At Roman law, there were various methods of making gratuitous
dispositions, 2' including that later referred to by the French as the donation
15. See, e.g., T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976);
Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Sherwood v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928); Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874);
Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Ticker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55 (La. App. 1914).
16. Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 933, 199 So. 2d 926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925
(1967); Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967); Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
17. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952); Succession of
Stothart, 303 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
18. T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
19. Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial, 317 So. 2d 179 (La. 1975).
20. Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
21.

3 MARCAD9, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n" 436-37 (7th ed. 1873) [herein-

after cited as MARCAD9]. Methods for gratuitous disposition of property at Roman
law included the donation inter vivos, the direct institution of an heir (a testamentary disposition whereby the donor designated the person whom he desired as his
universal representative), and the institution fideicommissary and .the legacy
fideicommissary, referred to generically as fideicommissa (testamentary dispositions whereby the donor designated a person, the institute, to receive the whole or
part of his estate, subject to the charge of preservation for and remission to
another, the substitute, of a specified portion of the estate). For a discussion of the
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6 cause de mort. The donation t6 cause de mort (in contemplation of
death) was an imperfect donation inter vivos, essentially revocable at the
donor's discretion, which became definitive only upon the death of the
donor, such that, if the donee predeceased the donor, the donation was
deemed never to have taken place. 22 The condition of the donor's prior
death could be suspensive or resolutory: if the former, the donee received

nothing until the donor died; but if the latter, the donee took the object of
the donation subject to its return if the condition failed to occur.23 A classic
example of the donation 6 cause de mort is found in Marcad6's illustration, "I give you these things now; but if I escape from the danger that
threatens me, you will return them to me." 2 4 Thus, the hallmark of the
25
donation was actually the transferor's power to revoke the gift at will.
French Law
Because the revocability tenet of the donation 6 cause de mort was

generally contrary to custom, 26 an attempt was made in France in 1731 to
regulate its use through legislative requirement that the donation be in the
Roman law on donations generally, see W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW § II at 253-58 (2d ed. 1932).
The French generally abolished the direct institution of an heir and the
fideicommissary as forms of gratuitous testamentary dispositions in article 896 of
the Code Napoleon. However, articles 1048-49 of the Civil Code authorized parents
to donate to their children, and brothers and sisters who die without posterity to
donate to one or more of their brothers and sisters, subject to the charge of
remitting the object of the donation to the latter's children born or to be born in the
first degree only. II AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 696. See LA. CIv. CODE arts.

1519-21.
22. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645; 3 MARCADI, supra note 21, at
nos. 436-37; 3 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 2519 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]. At Roman law, even if the donor
expressly provided that the donation was irrevocable, the transfer was still deemed
essentially a donation di cause de moil if its ultimate effectiveness depended on the
donor's prior demise. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645; 3 PLANIOL, supra,
at § 2519.
23. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645.
24. 3 MARCADIi, supra note 21, at n 436.
25. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645; 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at §
2519.

26. The donation 'a cause de mort was not widely recognized in France even
prior to 1731 because it was contrary to the maxim, "donner et retenir ne vaut" ("it
is impossible to give and keep at the same time"). See 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at
§ 2520: "[The donation'd cause de mort] was used . . . in the South, where it
replaced wills in favor of sons. In the region of customary law, it was used only
when the donor thought himself in an imminent danger of death, or when he made a
donation in contemplation of his death. Otherwise, the use of such donations was
generally rejected .... ." See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645.
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form authorized for testaments.27 However, since this requirement affected only the form of the transfer, the donation continued to exist
substantively intact in regions of France where it had long been used.28
The Code Napol6on of 1804 purported 29 to uniformly abolish the
donation c6 cause de mort as a mode of gratuitous disposition in France.
Article 893 of the Code provided that only two kinds of donations, inter
vivos and testamentary, were authorized; 30 article 944 expressly prohibited donations made on conditions solely within the donor's discretion. 3' The rationale of these provisions was to discourage donations of
property that otherwise would remain in the family for descent and
distribution by requiring for their validity permanent dispossession of the

objects of the donations. 32
27. The Parlement of Paris, in a decision of February 3, 1713, had held that
testamentary dispositions of property were void if not in the form required for
testaments. 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at § 2521. Article 3 of the Ordiance of 1731
codified the decision as follows (in pertinent part): "All donations h cause de mort
• . . shall henceforth have no effect, even in the regions where they are expressly
authorized by law or by custom, unless they are made in the same form provided for
testaments or codicils, so that in the future there shall only be two forms of
disposing of property, one of which is the donation inter vivos, and the other
testaments or codicils." See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9; 3 PLANIOL, supra
note 22, at § 2521.
28. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645 n.l.
29. See the text accompanying notes 36 & 37,.infra.
30. See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645 n.l. As with Civil Code
articles 1468 and 1469, form is of the essence for the validity of donations inter
vivos and testamentary under their source provisions, articles 894 and 895,
respectively, of the Code Napol6on. See 3 MARCADE, supra note 21, at § 437. 3
PLANIOL, supra note 22, at §§ 2510 & 2523 (proper form of donations inter vivos);
id. at §§ 2515 & 2681 (proper form of donation mortis causa).
31. See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645; 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at
§ 2522. In thus prohibiting all donations made on conditions solely within the
donor's will, the Code Napol6on, perhaps anomalously, treats donations generally
more rigorously than obligations, notwithstanding the former's essence of beneficence. For although a contractual obligation is essentially irrevocable, inasmuch as
one party thereto cannot dissolve the contract unilaterally, and although it is usually
considered null if contracted under a condition dependent solely upon the obligor's
will [art. 117 (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2034)], yet, if the parties to a contractual
obligation nevertheless stipulate that the contract depends upon the will of the
obligor "to do or not to do a certain act," [art. 1175 (LA. CIv. CODE art. 2035)] or
upon the will of the obligee "for its duration" [art. 1176 (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2036)],
the obligation contingent thereupon is deemed valid [arts. 1175-76 (LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 2035-36)]. Why the favorable treatment the Code affords contractual obligations was not extended to the donation, in view of its gratuitous nature, appears to
defy theoretical explanation and is likely owing to custom. See 11 AUBRY ET RAU,
supra note 9, at § 699 n.4-3.
32. 11 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 699 n.5.
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French commentators noted that, even though articles 893 and 944
effectively rendered the donation t6 cause de mort nugatory as a mode of
gratuitous transmission, only the tenet of revocability was in fact incompatible with donative principles of the Code. 31 In instances when a donation was made irrevocably, the Code did not purport to prohibit the gift
because of its contingency upon the donee's surviving the donor; 34 rather,
article 943 expressly permitted donations to be subordinated to any condition not dependent solely on the donor's will for execution. Thus, the
condition in an inter vivos donation that the donee outlive the donor did
not have the effect of resuscitating the prohibited donation c4 cause de
mort, for the donor would no longer be at liberty to dispose of the subject
35
property to the prejudice of the donee.

Despite the obvious rejection of the power of revocation in the inter
vivos donation, the Code Napol6on nonetheless specifically authorized
certain donations-those between spouses and those by marriage contract-that directly preserved the essential characteristic of the donation 6
cause de mort, its revocability. 36 Consequently, to conclude that the
donation 6 cause de mort was abolished completely in France is an
37
apparent misconception.
Louisiana Law
Such was the status of the donation 6 cause de mort at French law at
the time of the adoption of the Louisiana Digest of 1808. The redactors of
33. 10 id. at § 645; 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at § 2522.
34. See note 33, supra.
35. 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at §§ 2604-08. See 11 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note
9, at § 699 n.3, wherein it is further suggested that the occurrence of the condition of
the donor's prior demise would have a retroactive effect to the time of the gratuitious disposition that would nullify any interim acts of the donor prejudicing the
right of the donee to the object of the donation.
36. See 10 AUBRY ETRAU, supra note 9, at § 645; 3 MARCADi, supra note 21, at
§ 437; 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at § 2522. Code Napolkon articles 947 and 1083
(LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1532 and 1736, respectively) provide that gratuitous disposition by marriage contract is expressly exempt from the observation of certain
formalities generally mandated for the validity of donations inter vivos, including
the requirement of Code Napoleon article 944 (LA. CIv. CODE art. 1529) that such
donations not be made on conditions the execution of which is dependent solely
upon the will of the donor. Code Napoleon art. 1086 (former LA. CIv. CODE art.
1749, repealed by La. Acts 1942, No. 187). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:2351-52 (1950) (providing
that donations between spouses during marriage are revocable at the donor's will).
37. See 10 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 9, at § 645 (listing of other valid
gratuitous transmissions in which the donor retains revocatory power over the
object of the donation, including life insurance contracts).
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the Digest adopted provisions almost verbatim from articles 893, 943 and
944 of the Code Napol6on, and the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 retained
them virtually intact as articles 1467, 1527 and 1529, respectively. Hence,
the Civil Code provides that gratuitous dispositions may be accomplished
only by donations inter yivos or testamentary.38 A donation inter vivos
requires a prescribed acceptance during the donor's life39 and must divest
the donor presently and irrevocably of the object of the donation in favor
of the subject of his beneficence, 4° whereas a testamentary disposition
does not require acceptance during the donor's life4 and is always revocable. 42 Furthermore, an inter vivos donation with a condition the accomplishment of which is in the donor's sole power is null, 43 while one with a

condition not so dependent and not reprobated by law is valid. 44 And,
although the validity of the donation between spouses generally is no

longer recognized unless irrevocable," the validity of the donation by
marriage contract to children to be born of the marriage is still
47
acknowledged,' notwithstanding its concomitant revocability.
In 1901, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Succession of Sinnott v.
HiberniaNational Bank, 48 expressly dealt with the nature of the donation
6 cause de mort under Louisiana law. 49 Sinnott involved a contest be38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1467. Although article 1469 refers to donations in
contemplation of death as mortis causa, article 1570 expressly states that mortis
causa dispositions may be made only by testaments.
39. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1540-50.
40. Id. art. 1468. But cf. Quirk v. Smith, 124 La. 11, 49 So. 728 (1909) (holding
that although a donation inter vivos cannot be revoked by unilateral act of the
donor, nothing prevents the donee and donor together from annulling the act of
donation and restoring themselves to their original position).
41. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1469.
42. Id. arts. 1469, 1690-96.
43. Id.art. 1529.
44. Id.art. 1527.
45. Id. art. 1749, repealed by La. Acts 1942, No. 187. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:2351-52
(1950) (providing that where the donation between spouses is made by notarial act,
the donor spouse "may reserve the right of revocation by express stipulation
therein").
46. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1734-35.
47. Id. arts. 1532, 1736.
48. 105 La. 705, 30 So. 233 (1901). See Comment, The Application of the

ReciprocalRights andBenefit Rules To Foreign Legacies, 36 TUL. L. REV. 799, 82021 n.132 (1962).
49. The following five appeal court decisions have acknowledged the prohibition against the donation "acause de mort, citing for authority Sinnott: Succession
of Simpson, 311 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 839 (1975)
(citing Delaune and Crain, infra this note); Crain v. Crain, 175 So. 2d 665 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965); Succession of Delaune, 138 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962);
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tween a testamentary executrix and the alleged donee of inter vivos gifts
made by the decedent. During her life, Mrs. Sinnott had given to Mrs.
Langtry several shares of stock, 50 stipulating, "They are yours. At least,
after my death they are yours," 5 1 and "I want you to keep them after Iam
dead.' '52 Against Mrs. Langtry's claim of ownership of the stock via
donation, the executrix argued that, because the stock in fact belonged to
Mrs. Sinnott during her lifetime and could belong to Mrs. Langtry only at
the donor's death, the transaction was a prohibited donation 6 cause de
mort and hence null. After a vain attempt to distinguish between the
donation inter vivos, the donation mortis causa and the donation causa
mortis of the common law, 53 the court observed:
There is nothing . . .in our law which prevents a donor from
imposing upon his donation irnter vivos the condition that it should not
be effective until after the death, as was perhaps done in the present
case .... 54
However, following this completely accurate observation, the court inexplicably concluded:
In order to have been a manual gift inter vivos, it was essentially
necessary that the donor should have "devested [sic] herself at once
and irrevocably of the thing given, in favor of the donee who
accepted it." The moment the effect of the donation was to be
postponed to the death of the donor, it became an unauthorized
55
donation causa mortis.
In so holding, the court was patently in error, for the proscription of the
donation i cause de mort was due to its revocability at the donor's will,
not to its resolubility upon the death of the donee prior to that of the
Fontenot v. Drewniak, 181 So. 619 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938); Matulevitch v.

American Ry. Express Co., 6 Orl. App. 106 (La. App. 1923). See note 61, infra.
50. Mrs. Sinnott also had given Mrs. Langtry some furniture under the same
stipulation; however, the validity of the donation of the furniture was not at issue
on appeal. See note 60, infra.
51. 105 La. at 708, 30 So. at 234 (1901).
52. Id. at 709-10, 30 So. at 235.
53. The donation causa mortis of the common law is directly traceable to the
Roman donation "acause de mort. It is similarly inter vivos in nature, and made in
contemplation of death. Thus, the court's distinction is inaccurate. See E. CLARK,
L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 393-97 (2d ed. 1977); M. KASER,
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 327-28 (6th ed. R. Dannenbring transl. 1968); The Work of the

Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Successions and Donations,
36 LA. L. REV. 362, 373 (1976).
54. 105 La. at 713-14, 30 So. at 237.
55. Id. at 716, 30 So. at 238.
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donor. 56 As the court initially admitted, a donation subject to the suspensive condition of the donor's demise, a contingency neither contra bonos
mores nor within the donor's will, is clearly valid in Louisiana. 57 Likewise, the donor's prior death can be stipulated as a valid resolutory
condition. 58 Arguably, the validity of a donation c6cause de mort should
not have been at issue in Sinnott because the donation inter vivos of the
subject stock was invalid for another reason. It was not in the authentic
form prescribed for donation of incorporeal movables, 59 and this should
have foreclosed inquiry into the donor's retention of revocatory powers
over the donation. 6 Therefore, the court's conclusion could be characterized as pure, and moreover erroneous, dictum.
If the Sinnott language is viewed as dictum, no Louisiana case has
ever expressly voided a donation for being a genuinely prohibited donation
6 cause de mort. 6 1 Moreover, in view of the Civil Code's express authori56. See the text at notes 25, 26, & 33-35, supra.
57. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1527.
58. Articles 1534 and 1535 expressly allow the donor to stipulate for the right of
return of the gift, should he survive either the donee or the donee's descendants.
The effect of the return is a cancellation of all alienations of the property made by
the donee or his descendants. See 3 PLANIOL, supra note 22, at §§ 2615-27A (on
contractual reversion, wherein he states the right is not contrary to the rule "donner
et retenir ne vaut" because it succinctly expresses the intent of the donor who
wishes to make a personal gift, but does not desire that it pass to strangers after the
donee's death).
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1538. Cf. Uniform Stock Act, LA. R.S. 12:601 (1950)
(enacted in 1912 and establishing a requisite form for valid stock transfer). But cf.
Fontenot v. Drewniak, 181 So. 619 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) (disregarding the Act
and holding a manual gift of stock unaccompanied by delivery to be a prohibited
donation *a cause de mort on the authority of Sinnott.
60. As to the alleged gift of furniture (not at issue on appeal), corporeal
movables may be given validly by mere delivery (LA. Civ. CODE art. 1539); thus,
provided delivery was accomplished, the donation of the furniture should have
been upheld notwithstanding the stipulation that the gift was to be ineffective until
the donor's death. Mrs. Sinnott clearly divested herself presently and irrevocably
of the furniture at the time she made the donation because her power thenceforth to
dispose adversely of the property was irrevocably lost. Cf. Matulevitch v. American Ry. Express Co., 6 Orl. App. 106 (La. App. 1923) (citing Sinnott as authority
for the proposition that a manual inter vivos gift of a corporeal movable, a diamond
ring, was unenforceable as a donation 6i cause de mort absent delivery before the
donor's death).
61. However, appellate court decisions have voided donations, improperly
labelling them donations causa mortis in the process. See, e.g., Succession of
Simpson, 311 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 839 (1975)
(donation inter vivos of immovable property by authentic act from parent to
children held, in disregard of Civil Code article 1536, a prohibited donation causa
mortis because of extrinsic evidence that the donor did not intend to divest herself

1080

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

zation of certain revocable donations 62 and judicial recognition of revocable gratuitous designations of beneficiaries in various plans and policies,
the seed of the donation 6 cause de mort would seem firmly planted in

Louisiana's legal system.
Revocable Gratuitous Designations of Beneficiaries
Recognized in Louisiana
United States Savings Bonds
Louisiana acknowledges that the federal treasury regulations govern-

ing United States Savings Bonds 63 superimpose on state law methods for
disposing of property gratuitously in addition to the strictijuris forms for
donations outlined in the Code. 64 This acknowledgement includes state
recognition that proceeds of savings bonds belong to the designated coof property until death); Crain v. Crain, 175 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965)
(simulated sale from parent to child held a void donation causa mortis, citing
Sinnott); Succession of Delaune, 138 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) (simulated
sale of realty from parent to child with reservation of usufruct to the donor held a
prohibited donation causa mortis, citing Sinnott). See The Work of the Lousiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Successions and Donations, 36 LA. L.
REV. 362, 372-73 (1976) (criticism of Simpson).
62. See the text and notes 45-47, supra.
63. 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.0-.93 (1973). See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306
(1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (citing the Supremacy Clause, Article IV,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, as authority for the primacy of the
federal treasury regulations governing United States Savings Bonds as against state
donative schemes).
The pertinent federal treasury regulations governing United States Savings
Bonds include: 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1973) (establishing three permissible bond forms:
sole ownership, co-ownership (-X or Y") or beneficiary ("X payable on death to
Y")); § 315.20 (1973) (providing that no judicial determination will be recognized
that impairs the suvivorship rights established on behalf of co-owners or beneficiaries); § 315.60 (1973) (providing that during the lives of co-owners of coownership bond, bond will be paid to either upon separate request, and upon such
payment, the other shall cease to have any interest in the bond); § 315.61 (1973)
(providing that when one co-owner dies before the co-ownership bond is redeemed,
the surviving co-owner becomes absolute owner); and § 315.66 (1973) (providing
that beneficiary bonds, though payable to the owner during his lifetime, become the
absolute property of the beneficiary at the owner's death).
64. The leading Louisiana case, Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 404, 56 So.
2d 730, 731 (1952), noted: "[W]e are confronted with the fact that the U.S. Savings
bond plan establishes an additional method of disposing of property. . . superimposed by Federal law and which is to be considered effective notwithstanding that it
is not in the form prescribed by our Code." See also Succession of Gladney, 223
La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953); Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953);
Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947); Succession of Land, 212
La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947); Succession of Stothart, 303 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1974); Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
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owner or payable-on-death beneficiary of a bond in full ownership with
the right to immediate possession by virtue of the bond agreement. 65 Even
though Louisiana is powerless to alter the named payee of a savings
bond, 66 the jurisprudence is settled that donations of bonds, whether in coownership or payable-on-death beneficiary form, are subject to the stateprotected right of the forced heir to his 16gitime. 67 The rationale is that the
250 La. 933, 199 So. 2d 926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925
(1967); Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967); Succession of Mulqueeny, 172 So. 2d 326 (La. App.
4th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 248 La. 659, 181 So. 2d 384 (1965); Succession
of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So.
2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 92, 93-94, 157 So. 2d 234 (1963).
65. Decisions so holding as to the payable-on-death beneficiary bond are:
Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952); Succession of Stothart,
303 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); Succession of Mulqueeny, 172 So. 2d 326
(La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 248 La. 659, 181 So. 2d 384 (1965);
Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La.
92, 93-94, 157 So. 2d 234 (1963). Decisions so holding as to the designated co-owner
bond are: Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953); Slater v.
Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953); Succession of Geagen, 212 La. 574, 33
So. 2d 118 (1947); Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947); Succession
of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 933, 199 So. 2d
926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925 (1967); Succession of
Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922
(1967); Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
66. See note 65, supra.
67. See generally Comment, Problems in Classification of ParticularProperty
Under Community PropertyRegimes, 25 LA. L. REV. 108, 108-19 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Problems in Classification].In the leading case of Winsberg v. Winsberg,
220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952), the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged
savings bonds of the payable-on-death beneficiary type as an additional mode of
gratuitous property transmission mortis causa. The court further posited, however,
that the federal treasury bond regulations were designed to facilitate the federal
government and not "to interfere with the enforcement of the laws of descent and
distribution of the various States," (id. at 405, 56 So. 2d at 732) and concluded that
all state substantive provisions regarding testaments, other than those regarding
form, should be applied in determining property rights and liabilities. The court then
held, in accordance with article 1705, which provides that "a testament is revoked
by the posterior [anterior?] birth of a legitimate child to the testator," that the birth
of a posthumous child after issuance of bonds revoked the donation mortis causa of
bonds, noting, "[a]nd while Louisiana may not require that the bonds be paid to
anyone other than the named beneficiary, it undoubtedly has the power which was
reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, to decree that
the beneficiary or payee is indebted to the estate of the former owner, or his heir, in
an amount equal to the value of the gift." Id. at 407, 56 So. 2d at 732.
The Winsberg view appeared fairly unchallenged until 1962, when the United
States Supreme Court rendered the decision in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962), a
case arising under the community property laws of Texas. There, the court an-
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nounced that the federal regulations governing ownership and payment of bonds
were not intended merely to provide a convenient method of bond payment, but
also conferred the right of ownership on the payee of the bond. A Texas law that
required the surviving co-owner spouse of a co-ownership bond to account to the
deceased spouse's estate by way of reimbursement was held to be an interference
with the power of the federal government to borrow money that must yield under
the weight of the Supremacy Clause - a result strongly suggesting that the remedy
(full reimbursement) permitted in Winsberg, if not the entire thrust of the decision,
might have been constitutionally awry. See Note, 37 TUL. L. REV. 116, 118 (1962).
However, the court in Free did emphasize that "the [bond] regulations are not
intended to be a shield for fraud and relief would be available in a case where the
circumstances [of the bond designation manifest] fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto .... ." 369 U.S. at 670 (1962). See Comment, The Effect of
Survivorship Provisions in United States Savings Bonds Upon Louisiana Inheritance and Community Property Laws, 11 Loy. L. REV. 311 (1963), for early
predictions on the scope of the fraud exception.
Then, in 1963, in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964), a case arising
under the community property laws of Washington, in which the decedent's husband purchased a payable-on-death beneficiary bond with community funds and
named his brother as payee, the Supreme Court held that the husband had committed an act in fraud of his wife's community interest and that the wife had a onehalf interest in the proceeds. "It would seem obvious that the bonds may not be
used as a device to deprive the widow of property rights which she enjoys under
Washington law and which would not be transferable by her husband but for the
surivorship provisions of the federal bonds." Id. at 309. See Problems in Classification, supra, at 118-19 (suggests that the fraud exception of Free as interpreted by
Yiatchos may have meant that the use of savings bonds to deprive anyone of a
property interest under state law was fraud).
Resolution of the effect of Free and Yiatchos on Louisiana's forced heirship
laws was not decided until 1968 in one of a pair of related Louisiana court of appeal
cases, Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 933, 199 So. 2d 926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925
(1967). See also Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert'.
denied, 250 La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967). After analyzing the two federal decisions, the court concluded, "[w]e read [Yiatchos as] interpreting Free v. Bland to
mean that co-ownership or survivor bonds are not intended under Federal Treasury
Regulations to be used as a device to circumvent the established laws of the states
enacted for the protection of the rights of its citizens and thus deprive them of
property rights guaranteed by state laws." 197 So. 2d at 743. The court then
specifically held: "[t]herefore, we construe any attempt by a parent to breach this
right by the means of converting his estate into United States Savings Bonds,
payable to himself or a stranger or to a stranger upon his death, as a circumvention
of the laws of Louisiana enacted for the protection of forced heirs from unwarranted disinherison. This is a wrong no less grievous than a breach of fiduciary trust in
management of community property to the prejudice of his wife's vested property
right." Id. at 744. The Guerre court then held that the forced heirs involved had an
action for reduction of the subject bonds in order to acquire their 16gitime.
Thus, after Guerre, Louisiana jurisprudence apparently views all bond beneficiary designations as subject to the claims of forced heirs. Recently, though, in
Succession of Stothart, 303 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), the court, while
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federal bond regulations were promulgated primarily for fiscal purposes
and were not intended to afford a device for circumventing property rights
guaranteed by state law .68 Furthermore, regardless of the type of bond
involved, the right of the forced heir to his 16gitime is deemed to include

the correlative rights to add fictitiously the value of all bond designations
to the active mass of the succession and to reduce any excessive bond
donation impinging on the forced portion.
Because the Code's action for reduction is limited literally to inter
vivos and mortis causa donations, and the process of aggregation fictitiously returns only inter vivos donations to the active mass, 69 the courts
apparently deemed it essential to assimilate gratuitous bond designations
to donations inter vivos and mortis causa in order to invoke the measures

that protect the rights of forced heirs. Regarding the savings bond designation of the payable-on-death beneficiary type, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in 1952, in Winsberg v. Winsberg,7 ° decided that such a designation constitutes an additional method of donation mortis causa, since, by
its nature, the designation is made in contemplation of death;71 and yet,
acknowledging the validity of the above proposition, refused to subject the bond
involved to another substantive provision of state law on testamentary dispositions,
specifically rejecting application to the bond of the Louisiana rule that a legacy is
revoked by a revocation contained in a subsequent will. The court further noted
that, in light of the limited fraud exception recognized in Yiatchos and Guerre,
Winsberg may be too far afield in subjecting bonds to Louisiana substantive law
and especially in requiring the payee to account for the full value of the bond rather
than just the forced portion. However, there lingers a real factual question in
Stothart as to whether the testator intended a revocation at all; perhaps the court's
criticism of Winsberg is merely dictum. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Successions and Donations, 36 LA. L. REV. 362,
369-79 (1976).

68. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 404-05, 56 So. 2d 730, 732 (1952):
"Indeed, it seems manifest that the regulations of the Treasury Department for the
payment of savings bonds . . . were designed solely to facilitate the Government,
by providing a simple method for the liquidation of these obligations, so that it
would not be subjected to the inconvenience and delays attendant to the settlement
of conflicting or disputed claims." Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App.
4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 933, 199 So. 2d 926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250
La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925 (1967): "A superimposition upon the laws of Louisiana of
such a device as an additional method of disherison [sic] of forced heirs could not
conceivably serve any federal interest, such as we have conceded in respect to the
superimposition upon our law of that device as an additional method of transmitting
or disposing of property." See also Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 954-58, 67
So. 2d 547, 549-50 (1953); Problems in Classification, supra note 67, at 119 n.49.
69. See notes 11-13, supra.
70. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
71. Id. at 402-03, 56 So. 2d at 731: "That the designation by the purchaser of
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the court held a bond payee indebted to a forced heir for the full value of a
payable-on-death bond ,72 rather than merely for the amount by which the
bond exceeded the disposable portion, which would have been the proper
remedy for an excessive mortis causa donation. Then, in 1965, the court,
while stating that the proceeds of a payable-on-death beneficiary bond did
74
73
not form part of a decedent's estate, affirmed an appellate court case
that ordered the addition of the value of such bonds to the active mass of
the subject succession 75 even though only donations inter vivos are includible in this calculation under the Code's donative scheme.
With regard to the savings bond designation of the co-ownership
type, the supreme court, in a 1947 decision, 76 without characterizing the
subject co-ownership bond designations as donations inter vivos or mortis
causa, nevertheless reserved to a forced heir the right "to claim his full
legitime and to claim collations because of these gifts. "7 In a later case,7S
the court again declined to categorize the co-ownership bond, although it
noted that the bond designation is decidedly not a donation mortis causa,
Federal Savings Bonds of a beneficiary, to whom bonds become payable on the
purchaser's death, constitutes a donation mortis causa, as defined by Article 1469
of the Civil Code, is no longer an open question in this State. It was held in
Succession of Raborn . . .that such bonds were gifts 'made in contemplation of
death' . . ." See also Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947)
(court reasoned that a husband's purchase with community funds of payable-ondeath beneficiary bonds in favor of a stranger entitled his wife to an amount
equivalent to one-half the value of the bonds at the husband's death, for to hold
otherwise would constitute a disposition mortis causa of the wife's community
interest); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 TermSuccessions and Donations, 13 LA. L. REV. 272, 275 (1953).
72. 220 La. at 407, 56 So. 2d at 730 (1952).
73. But see United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973), holding that the
value of bonds given to a co-owner must be included in the donor's gross estate for
tax purposes where the bonds have not been properly reissued. The decision
acknowledges that there is not a valid donation until the acceptance necessary to
perfect the gift-reissuance--occurs. Until reissuance, the co-ownership bond remains at the co-owner-donor's disposal. See Note, 8,U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1973).
74. Succession of Mulqueeny, 172 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 248 La. 659, 181 So.2d 384 (1965). See also Succession of Mulqueeny,
156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 92, 93-94, 157 So. 2d 234
(1963).
75. 248 La. at 664, 181 So. 2d at 386: "The United States Savings bonds
mentioned above were payable on death . . . , but, although they are to be
fictitiously added to the estate to calculate the legitime, they are not otherwise part
of the estate."
76. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
77. Id.at 133, 31 So. 2d at 619.
78. Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).
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because it neither specifically purports to nor evinces an intent to effec80
79
tuate a gift in contemplation of death. Then, in 1964, an appellate court
for the first time expressly denominated the designation of a beneficiary in
a co-ownership bond as a mode of donation inter vivos superimposed by
federal law, 81 and further noted, in dictum, that the value of the coownership bond is includible in the calculation of a forced heir's 16gitime,
but without detailing a method of inclusion. 82 Finally, in 1968, the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied review in a pair of related appellate court
decisions 83 that both recognized designations in co-ownership bonds as
donations inter vivos and also acknowledged the rights of the respective
forced heirs to proceed against the payees of the subject bonds "in the
same manner as if an equal amount of money had been given to them
'
through the medium of donation inter vivos. 84
Thus, notwithstanding the difference in judicial characterization of

the co-ownership and the payable-on-death beneficiary bonds, the rights
of the alternate co-owner and those of the beneficiary-on-death to receive
bond proceeds are limited by the obligation to account to a forced heir for
invasion of the forced portion. Succinctly, the courts include in the
formulation of the active mass of the succession and subject to the action
for reduction gratuitous bond designations regardless of the type of bond

involved

85

79. Id. at 970, 64 So. 2d at 737 (a community property case recognizing the
surviving spouse as owner of a co-ownership bond in the name of the husband orwife, but as indebted to deceased spouse's estate for one-half the value of the
bonds).
80. Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
81. Id. at 793-94, citing as authority Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d
609 (1947). See the text at notes 76-77, supra.
82. 162 So. 2d at 794: "It is to what extent these bonds figure in calculating the
inheritance tax or a legitime or an interference with the rights of a child born
subsequently to the naming of a payee on death that the state law governs." See
also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-Successions and Donations, 25 LA. L. REV. 291, 315 (1965); Wisdom & Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in LouisianaEstate Planning,26 TUL. L. REV. 119 (1952).
83. Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 933, 199 So. 2d 926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925
(1967); Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250
La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967).
84. 197 So. 2d 738, 745 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 933, 199 So. 2d
926, 250 La. 929, 199 So. 2d 925, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 925 (1967).
85. Logically, both types of bond designations should be subject to collation
(LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1227-88) and to reduction in the inverse order in which they are
made (id. art. 1507) in the manner of inter vivos donations, rather than on a pro rata
basis (id. art. 1511), as would be the case for mortis causa dispositions.
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Since the federal treasury regulations governing United States Savings Bonds were framed without reference to or regard for state donative
classifications, there is no justification for the courts' wrenching codal
donative concepts in order to accommodate a scheme of gratuitous transmission the Code does not envision. Characterization of a co-ownership
bond designation as a donation inter vivos disregards that donation's
crucial feature of irrevocability, since the purchaser of a co-ownership
86
bond may alter the designated co-owner of the bond at his choosing.
Additionally, the alternate co-owner of a co-ownership bond need not
perfect his ownership thereof by the mode of acceptance prescribed for a
donation inter vivos. Similarly, assuming arguendo that federal bond
regulations superimpose on state law a method for gratuitous disposition
"mortis causa," permitting the value of the payable-on-death beneficiary
bond to be added with other assets to form the active mass of the
succession disregards the Code's reservation of aggregation to the donation inter vivos alone and infuses the bond designation with an unauthorized dual personality.
Rather than to twist the Code's donative concepts in an effort to
classify United States Savings Bonds, it would seem preferable to acknowledge that a bond designation constitutes a method of gratuitous
transmission beyond the purview of the Code's donative scheme. Characterization as a donation c6cause de mort would properly close the resulting
classification hiatus. Foremost, it would correctly describe a fundamental
element of savings bonds, the donor's right to change the beneficiary
(revocability). Moreover, like both types of bond designations, the donation 6 cause de mort is a donation inter vivos in nature, while, like the
payable-on-death beneficiary bond designation, it is made in contemplation of death and its effect is contingent on the death of the donor prior to
that of the donee. Classification of a gratuitous bond designation as a
donation 6 cause de mort would not immunize bond beneficiaries from
accounting to forced heirs for invasion of the 16gitime because of both the
inter vivos nature of the donation and the fundamental nature of forced
heirship. 87 Rather, under the suggested classification, the courts uniformly
could safeguard the rights of forced heirs with respect to bond designations
through use of the Code's mechanisms for regulation of inter vivos
donations (aggregation and reduction) without resort to a strained interpretation of the strictijuris system of donative classification.
86. 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (1973).
87. See the text and note 109, infra.
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Insurance Policies
The Louisiana Civil Code was shaped virtually without reference to

insurance,88 principally because the real growth of insurance law in the
United States and on the continent occurred after the redaction of the
Louisiana Digest of 1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825.89 In the
absence of guiding legislation, courts early eschewed the attempt to apply

the Code's provisions governing donations to the gratuitous designation of
a third party beneficiary of a life insurance policy, notwithstanding their
ostensible common nature of beneficence.9 Rather, the courts classified
the life insurance contract as sui generis,gl fully exempt from the Code's
donative regulations, both substantive and procedural, and governed by
rules peculiar to itself.92 One such unique rule the judiciary formulated
88. See generally Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in
Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 369, 369-72 (1932). The Louisiana Digest of 1808
expressly provided that insurance law was "foreign from this code" (Digest, Book
3, Title 12, Article 1), probably in contemplation that a code of commerce would be
drafted that would govern insurance law. Id. at 369. However, Nabors observed:
"After the adoption of the Civil Code of 1825, which omitted the clause "foreign
from this code," it was not possible to argue that the Civil Code according to its
specific terms [arts. 1827, 3184, 3204] had no application to insurance." Id. at 371.
Articles 1827, 3184 and 3204 of the Code of 1825, each with passing reference to
"insurance," were continued as articles 1833, 3217 and 3237, respectively, in the
Civil Code of 1870.
89. Id. at 369-70.
90. See, e.g., Succession of Henderson, 113 La. 101, 36 So. 904 (1904); Succession of Emenet, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902); In re Crane, 47 La. Ann. 896, 17 So.
431 (1895); Succession of Bofenschen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877); Succession of
Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874).
91. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 170 So. 2d 895, 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (forced heirs denied proceeds
of a group life insurance policy: "[I]t has been horn book law in Louisiana for many
years that the beneficiaries of an insurance policy prevail over all because insurance
is sui generis and not subject to the codal restrictions relative to donations.");
Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55, 60 (La. App. 1917) (forced
heirs denied proceeds of life insurance policy notwithstanding that ancestor left no
other property besides the policy: "As we appreciate the jurisprudence of this
state, a life insurance policy is a contract sui generis governed by rules peculiar to
itself, the outgrowth of judicial precedent and not of legislation.").
92. T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Sizeler v.
Sizeler, 179 La. 128, 130, 127 So. 388, 389 (1930) ("[T]he rules of our Civil Code
relating to donations inter vivos or motis causa have no application to life insurance
policies .. ");Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35
(1928); Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438, 440 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (court
rejected second wife's attack on proceeds payable to son of her husband's first
marriage on the ground that the designation of a beneficiary was a donation invalid
because not evidenced by authentic act: "[S]ince the proceeds of life insurance
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was that the proceeds of a life insurance policy, if payable to a named
beneficiary, inured93 to the beneficiary directly and did not form part of the
decedent's estate.

The result of this jurisprudential treatment was that designation of a
beneficiary in a life insurance policy could effectively defeat the right of
the forced heir to his 16gitime, 94 as well as his ancillary rights to demand
reduction of excessive donations,95 aggregation of inter vivos donations9 6
and collation.97 Justification for this result was based upon the sui generis
nature of life insurance and the proposition that, because life insurance
proceeds did not become exigible during the insured's lifetime, they were
not a part of his estate and therefore were not properly subject to claim by
forced heirs. 98 Only if the policy was payable to the insured's estate did
form no part of the decedent's estate the rules of the Civil Code relating to
donations inter vivos or mortis causa have no application as respects life insurance
policies.
); Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55 (La. App.
1914).
93. T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Sizeler v.
Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166
La. 829, 834, 118 So. 35, 37 (1928) ("It is well settled also that the proceeds of such
policies form no part of the estate of the deceased and inure to the beneficiary
directly and by the sole terms of the policy itself."); Succession of Hearing, 26 La.
Ann. 326 (1874); Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438, 440 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ("It is well established by the decisions of our Supreme Court that the
proceeds or avails of life insurance, if payable to a named beneficiary and not to the
estate or to the heirs . . . of the insured, belong to the beneficiary named");
Williams v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 57 So. 2d 600 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Successions and
Donations, 27 LA. L. REV. 450 (1967); Note, 17 TUL. L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1942).
94. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 114 La. 652, 38 So. 485 (1905), the
insured designated his concubine as beneficiary; the designation was attacked by
his forced heirs and, contrary to all earlier jurisprudence, the court held that the
children were entitled to nine-tenths of the proceeds in accordance with article
1481. Neal was overruled in the landmark decision of Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128,
127 So. 388 (1930), wherein a neice married her uncle in a state that allowed
marriage between Jewish people within that degree of consanguinity; the two
moved to Louisiana, where the husband later purchased a life insurance policy in
which he named his wife beneficiary. After his death, his children from a former
marriage sued for the proceeds thereof alleging that the marriage was null under
Louisiana law because donations of movables to concubines are permissible only
up to one-tenth of the estate. The court held that a life insurance policy is sui
generis, not subject to the laws of donations inter vivos or mortis causa, and
immune from claims by forced heirs.
95. E.g., Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55 (La. App. 1914).
96. See note 95, supra.
97. E.g., Vinson v. Vinson, 105 La. 30, 29 So. 701 (1901).
98. Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942); Sizeler v. Sizeler,
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the proceeds enter his succession and become amenable to claim by forced
99
heirs.
In 1940, the legislature enacted a statute that confirmed and codified
the sui generis view of life insurance proceeds developed by the courts. 10
Later, another statute was passed which expressly declared that the lawful
beneficiary of a life insurance policy is entitled to the proceeds thereof
0
without regard to claims by forced heirs.' '
170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Vinson v. Vinson, 105 La. 30, 29 So. 701 (1901). In
Vinson, the tutrix of the insured's child by a third marriage sued to compel three
children by the first two marriages to collate the proceeds of a life insurance policy
that decedent made payable to them. The court noted: "In our view, the perfect
equality sought among the heirs is the equality which requires ordinarily that there
shall be an equal division of the property among the heirs. This does not embrace
the amount of the policy which never belonged to the one from whom the heirs
inherit, and that was not, in the eye of the law, obtained from him, and therefore
was not transmitted as a right to his estate to compel collation." Id. at 33, 29 So. at
702. One writer criticized this rationale as follows: "The argument is obviously a
technical one which was framed in the process of rationalizing to justify the
decision. It ignores the fact that the right to the proceeds arose out of a contract
made by the deceased." Nabors, supra note 88, at 390. See also Daggett, General
Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law, 11 TUL. L. REV. 399, 405 (1937);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Successions
and Donations, 29 LA. L. REV. 450 (1967); Note, 17 TUL. L. REV. 321, 322-33
(1942).
99. E.g., Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
Furthermore, a life insurance policy which names no beneficiary is part of the
decedent's estate. Howard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 10 Ori. App. 94 (La. App.
1912).
100. LA. R.S. 22:1521 (1950) (originally enacted as La. Acts 1940, No. 292, §§
1,2) provided:
"Donations inter vivos of life insurance policies, and the naming of beneficiaries therein, whether revocably or irrevocably, are not governed by the
provisions of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 or any other laws of this state, relative
to the form of donations inter vivos.
This Section does not effect a change in the laws of this state nor does it
indicate that the laws relative to the form which donations inter vivos must take
ever applied to donations inter vivos of life insurance policies or to the naming of
beneficiaries therein."
The second paragraph was amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 157, §§ I & 2, to
read: "This section is remedial and retrospective. All donations inter vivos of life
insurance policies made on or before July 31, 1968 are valid and effective, whether
or not such donations were made in the form prescribed by the Civil Code or by any
other laws of this state." See Oppenheim, The Donation Inter Vivos, 43 TUL. L.
REV. 731, 738 (1969), explaining the amendment as follows: "In order to further
assure that, for federal tax purposes, the insured may surrender the incidents of
ownership and remove the proceeds of the policy from his estate, particularly in
instances of interspousal donations, the relevant statutes have been amended to
assure retroactive effect to all such donations."
101. LA. R.S. 22:647(A), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125, provides: "The
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The courts were correct in the determination that proceeds of a life
insurance policy defy the Code's donative classification. The supreme
court long ago acknowledged the power of an insured to alter the benefi12
ciary of his life insurance policy at will, if permissible under the policy,
and recognized, as a corollary, that no beneficiary of a policy acquires any
vested interest therein until the death of the insured. 10 3 Thus, the insured's
power of revocation negates characterization of a life insurance designation as a donation inter vivos. And, while the above characteristic tends
favorably toward its classification as a testamentary disposition, an insurance policy lacks requisite testamentary form. 104
However, even though the life insurance beneficiary designation
eludes the Code's donative classification, it is preferable to characterize it
as a donation t6 cause de mort, rather than to apply the nondescript sui
generis label. 05 Denomination as a donation t cause de mort, which is in
essence a revocable inter vivos donation made in contemplation of death,
accurately characterizes the principal features of the life insurance designation-revocability and dependency on the donor's prior demise for
lawful beneficiary . . .of a life insurance policy .. .shall be entitled to the
proceeds and avails of the policy against the creditors and representatives of the
insured . . .and against the heirs and legatees of either such person, and such
proceeds and avails shall be exempt from all liability for any debt of such beneficiary, payee, or assignee, or estate existing at the time the proceeds or avails are
made available for his own use."
102. Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874).
103. See, e.g., Berry v. Franklin State Bank, 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937);
Dorsett v. Thomas, 152 La. 60, 92 So. 734 (1922); Alba v. Provident Sav. Life
Assur. Soc'y, 118 La. 1021, 43 So. 663 (1907). But see Catalano v. United States,
429 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the court, interpreting Louisiana law,
concluded: "That a policy of insurance, issued at the instance of the husband, upon
his own life, in favor of his wife, inures to her separate benefit from the date of its
issuance, and that the interest so acquired by the wife is not then or thereafter
affected by the fact that the premiums are paid by the husband from the funds of
the community." Id. at 1060-61. The case is criticized in Comment, The Confusion
of Catalano: Transfers of Ownership Versus Irrevocable Beneficiary Designation,
16 Loy. L. REV. 415 (1970), which contends that the case misconstrued Louisiana
law and that an insured has the privilege of reserving his right to change the
beneficiary of his life insurance policy because the right of a beneficiary to death
proceeds is only an expectancy which can be divested at any time.
104. There is, of course, no superimposition of form as is true in the instance of
United States Savings Bonds.
105. Contra, Comment, Interspousal Donations of Life Insurance Policies in
Louisiana, 40 TUL. L. REV. 131, 148-49 (1965), wherein the author submits that
judicial treatment of life insurance as sui generis has infused the term with a
sufficient degree of meaning so as to allow dispositions of insurance problems
without resort to Code provisions on donations.
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efficacy. Instead, by labelling the life insurance designation sui generis,
the courts ipso facto foreclosed application of all donative regulations,
including measures that protect the interests of forced heirs. One writer
had early admonished:
The [theory] that the articles of the Civil Code on donations do
not apply to insurance may tend to lead to an incorrect result because
it . . . obscures a proper analysis of the problem. The rules of the
Civil Code on donations should not be considered as binding in
insurance cases because they were framed without specific reference
to insurance. . . . The decisions seem to indicate that the Louisiana
courts do not feel free to apply some of the rules on donations and to
deny the application of the others. The courts sometimes seem to
have gone further than admitting that they are not bound by the
donations articles and have concluded that they cannot reach a result
which a Code article sanctions. 106
Perhaps had the courts instead characterized the life insurance designation as a donation 6 cause de mort, which categorization inherently
emphasizes the inter vivos donative nature of the contract rather than its
non-Code origin, there would not have been automatic rejection of the
Code's donative protectionist measures. An analytical quandary results
from the attempt to appreciate the courts' and legislature's determination
that the life insurance designation somehow involves questions of public
policy different from those involved in inter vivos and mortis causa
donations as regards the rights of forced heirs.
Recently," °7 in reaffirming judicial decisions that uphold circumvention of the rights of forced heirs by means of life insurance designation,
the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, "The jurisprudential rule has
now been incorporated in our statutory law . . . . It can no longer be
changed by court decision, even if we were inclined to do so."' 08 In view
of the constitutional protection afforded forced heirs in Louisiana,' °9 the
court's observation appears incorrect. It is true that, because the applicable
provisions of both the 1921 and 1974 Louisiana Constitutions state that
"no law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship," constitutional attack
106. Nabors, supra note 88, at 402-03.
107. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
108. Id. at 847.
109. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; La. Const. art. IV, § 16(1921). For a discussion of
the historical basis of forced heirship in Louisiana, see Dainow, The Early Sources
of Forced Heirship;Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42 (1941);
Nabors, supra note 88, at 388-90; Comment, Forced Heirs, The Legitime and Loss
of the Legitime in Louisiana, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710 (1963).
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on the life insurance statutes first would require that the court afford the
provisions an other than strictly literal interpretation. At the least, this
would appear justifiable in a case where the decedent's sole asset consisted
of a life insurance policy the proceeds of which were payable to a third
party beneficiary."' Under these circumstances, to permit life insurance
proceeds to circumvent the claim of a forced heir obviously would result in
abolishing forced heirship for the heir.
But beyond rendering a decision as to the unconstitutionality of the
statutes themselves, the court would also have to acknowledge that prior
judicial decisions regarding donations of life insurance policies as sui
generis and exempt from forced heirship provisions were not in accord
with the constitution."' In a constitutional attack on the legislation and
jurisprudence, the donation h cause de mort classification of a life insurance designation would aptly serve as the vehicle for restoration of the
rights of forced heirs. By virtue of the inter vivos nature of the donation,
the mechanisms of aggregation and reduction would constitute appropriate

enforcement tools.112
110. This hypothetical problem was suggested by the facts of Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., II Orl. App. 55 (La. App. 1914).
111. For the classic example of a judicial decision overruling years of jurisprudence as unconstitutional, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in which
the United States Supreme Court noted, "Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is
. . . an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States
. .. . In disapproving that doctrine . . . we merely declare that in applying the
doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion
are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." Id. at 79-80.
112. Short of holding the life insurance statutes unconstitutional, and should the
court reject the donation d cause de mort characterization, an additional way of
attacking the statutes would be to argue that only life insurance proceeds, and not
premiums, are immune from claim by forced heirs. There is jurisprudence and
doctrine which suggest that this alternative attack might have viability. See
Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 920,
199 So. 2d 922 (1967); Cohen, Louisiana Civil Law As Applied to Life Insurance, 12
LA. L. REV. 56, 66, 72 (1951); Little, Insurance and Federal Estate Tax Recent
Developments, 16 LA. B.J. 17 (1968) (contending that LA. R.S. 22:1521 is limited to
proceeds and is inapplicable to premiums); Comment, Interspousal Donations of
Life Insurance in Louisiana, 40 TUL. L. REV. 131 (1965); Note, 15 LOY. L. REV. 189
(1968).
See Comment, ForcedHeirs, The Legitime and Loss of the Legitime in Louisiana, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 759-62 (1963) (author faults the Louisiana Legislature for
failing to amend the Code to treat adequately the changing financial mores of a
society in which insurance plays a major role). Cf. Swiss Civ. Code art. 476 (Shick
transl. 1915) (adds to the estate of the deceased the surrender value of the insurance
claim at the time of the testator's death if the insured transferred the insurance
claim to a third party by donation).
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Annuity Policies

In 1942, in Succession of Rabouin, "3 the Louisiana Supreme Court
decided, in contrast to the sui generis treatment of life insurance proceeds,
that the balance of an annuity policy payable to a named beneficiary forms
part of a decedent's estate, amenable to claim by forced heirs through
reduction and includible in the formulation of the active mass of the
succession. 1 4 The rationale for the distinction was that, whereas insurance
proceeds payable to a designated beneficiary do not become exigible
during the insured's lifetime and do not comprise a part of his estate,115
payment under an annuity contract is part of a pool of assets that belongs
to the annuitant during his lifetime. 116 In 1944, the legislature overruled
the judiciary's characterization of annuity contract proceeds by enacting a
statute that afforded them the same immunity from claim by forced heirs
enjoyed by life insurance proceeds. 117 This provision was repealed, however, by the Louisiana Insurance Code of 1948,11 and the legislature has
since expressly provided that the lawful beneficiary of the proceeds of the
annuity policy is fully answerable to forced heirs. 119
113. 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942). See Cahn, Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REV.
56, 68-69 (1951); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term-Successions and Donations, 27 LA. L. REV. 450 (1967); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-1943 Term--Successions, 5 LA. L. REV. 512,
517 (1944); Note, 17 TUL. L. REV. 489, 489-91 (1942).
114. In Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945), the supreme
court carried Rabouin to its logical conclusion and held that the balance of an
annuity contract payable to a named beneficiary was a part of the decedentannuitant's estate for inheritance tax purposes. See also Wisdom & Pigman, Te;tamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate Planning, 26 TUL. L. REV. 119, 130-39
(1952) (for a general discussion of the tax consequences of annuity contracts).
115. See note 98, supra, for a criticism of this tenet.
116. 201 La. 227, 235-36, 9 So. 2d 529, 531 (1942). See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1942-1943 Term-Successions, 5 LA. L. REV. 512, 517
(1949); Note, 17 TUL. L. REV. 489, 491 (1942) (enumerating various distinctions
recognized between annuities and insurance policies at common law).
117. La. Acts 1944, No. 221, repealed by La. Act 1948, No. 195 (not re-enacted
in the Louisiana Insurance Code of 1948).
118. Id. See LA. R.S. 22:1521 (Supp. 1958) (text of which is cited at note 100,
supra).
119. LA R.S. 22:647(B) (1958). But cf. Succession of Lantz, 176 So. 2d 224 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 La. 372, 178 So. 2d 659 (1965) (court properly held
that where the unpaid balance of an annuity contract had become exigible on
account of the annuitant's death before the repeal of La. Acts 1944, No. 21, the
balance should be assimilated to the proceeds of a life insurance policy in accordance with the act, so that the balance passed to the payee by virtue of the terms of
the contract, immune from claims by forced heirs). See The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Successions and Donations, 27 LA. L.
REV. 450 (1967).
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The courts very properly have not attempted to classify the annuity
contract designation as a donation inter vivos or mortis causa, because, as
with designations in life insurance policies, the annuity policy designation
does not comport with requisite donative form, authentic or testamentary. 120 Moreover, since the annuity contract designation is really an inter
vivos donation, which is usually revocable at the annuitant's will, made in
expectation of death and dependent for its effect on the beneficiary's
surviving the annuitant and on there remaining at the annuitant's death an
unpaid balance of the annuity fund, donation 6 cause de mort is a proper
demonination. Judicial subjugation of annuity contract proceeds to the
rights of forced heirs through the computation of the active mass of the
succession and reduction, despite the literal non-applicability to such
proceeds of the Code's donative remedies, 121 evidences the exact result
obtainable by treatment of the proceeds as a donation 6 cause de mort.
However, in addition to depicting correctly the essential donative characteristics of the annuity contract designation, the proposed classification
offers a desirable uniform treatment.
Benefit Plans
In 1976, in T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 122 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held on rehearing that an employee's written designation,
on a printed form, of a beneficiary to receive death benefits from an
employee retirement and profit sharing plan is a valid contractualdesignation, notwithstanding non-compliance with Code provisions regulating the
form of donations. 123 The court acknowledged, though, that while the
120. In Jochum v. Estate of Favre, 313 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), the
appeal court treated accumulated deductions from an employee's salary for a
retirement plan as proceeds due under an annuity contract, and held that the
deductions formed a part of the employee's estate for computation of the active
succession mass. See The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1975-1976
Term-Successions and Donations, 37 LA. L. REV. 421, 439 (1977).
121. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-1943 TermSuccessions, 5 LA. L. REV. 512, 517 n.6 (1944): "The arguments against computing
the residue of an investment such as an annuity in the forced portions are so weak
as to appear almost frivolous."
122. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
123. Id. at 855. On original hearing the court had held the designation utterly null
for non-compliance with the code's donative form requirements. Id. at 847. See The

Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Successions and
Donations, 37 LA. L. REV. 421, 435-39 (1977); The Work of the LouisianaLegislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Trusts and Estate Planning, 37 LA. L. REV. 131,
131-32 (1976).
An important aspect of T. L. James which this paper does not consider is its
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beneficiary receives the plan benefits in full ownership, he is accountable
to any complaining forced heir of the deceased employee if his receipt of
the proceeds impinges on the heir's forced portion. 24 The opinion expressly refused to assimilate payment of death benefits to the contractual
beneficiary of a retirement plan with payment of proceeds to the designated beneficiary of a life insurance policy 125 and noted that, absent
legislative mandate, the court will not permit employment-based benefit
126
arrangements to negate the fundamental rights of forced heirs.
In 1976 the legislature enacted a statute 127 which affirms T.L. James
in providing that any designation form allowed by a deferred compensation plan is effective for the purpose of naming a beneficiary 28 without
requirement of particular donative form, 129 and expands the decision by
holding that portions of a retirement benefit reflecting compensation to an employee while married and living under the community of gains is a community asset. See
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Matrimonial
Regimes, 37 LA. L. REV. 358, 369-71 (1977). See also The Louisiana Estate Planner,
Vol. 2, No. 6, at 45 (June, 1976), in which the writer criticizes as unrealistic the
court's assumption that the typical retirement plan maintains a separate account for
each employee that accurately reflects the amount of benefits earned by the
employee during any given period.
124. 332 So. 2d at 855. That the beneficiary must account to complaining forced
heirs results from the court's holding that employee profit sharing and retirement
plan benefits reflect additional earnings of an employee that form a part of his
estate.
125. Moreover, the opinion overruled appeal court decisions that had made the
analogy and had concluded that, since an employee's contractual designation of a
payee to receive death benefits of a retirement plan was beyond the purview of the
codal donative scheme, the benefits did not form part of the employee's estate and
the beneficiary took the proceeds free from the rights of forced heirs (and the
surviving spouse in community). Expressly overruled were Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), and Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d
438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). 332 So. 2d at 853 n.4. Cf. T.L. James & Co. v.
Montgomery, 308 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
The Official Revision Comments to La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S.
23: 652 (Supp. 1976) point out, though, that the treatment of deferred compensation
plan benefits under the recent legislation is analogous to that of life insurance
proceeds insofar as neither kind of benefit forms any part of the donor-employee's
estate; however, treatment clearly differs as regards the claims of forced heirs, to
which the beneficiary of the proceeds of a deferred compensation plan, unlike the
payee of life insurance proceeds, is fully answerable. See note 134, infra.
126. 332 So. 2d at 852, 853.
127. La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:651-53 (Supp. 1976). See The
Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Trusts and Estate
Planning, 37 LA. L. REv. 131, 131-32 (1976).
128. La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:652(1) (Supp. 1976).
129. Id., adding LA. R.S. 23:652(2) (Supp. 1976). The Official Revision Comments to the provision note that since many large payrolls cross state lines, it would
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'broadening the definition of "plan" to include "plans which provide
pensions, retirement, disability or death benefits and deferred compensation by employment, agency, trade union, stock bonus, stock ownership,
stock option and profit sharing plans,"' 130 as well as employee pension
benefit plans governed by ERISA.131 Moreover, the contractual designation remains effective until revoked or terminated in accordance with the
plan's procedure. 132 The Official Revision Comments to the 1976 statute
cite approvingly the T.L. James determination that the beneficiary entitled
to payment of proceeds of a deferred compensation plan is answerable to a
33
complaining forced heir for violations of the forced portion.
T. L. James and the ensuing legislation validating a designation form
in a deferred compensation plan as a mode of gratuitous disposition make
manifest that gratuitous transactions need neither fit the Code's strictijuris
donative forms nor constitute a part of the decedent's estate 34 in order to
be subject to the remedies that vindicate the rights of forced heirs. In view
of the revocability of designation forms3 5 and the contingency of the
employee's death before receipt of benefits by the designated beneficiary
in the typical deferred compensation plan, as well as its essential nature as
an inter vivos donation in prospect of death, such a plan is perfectly
suitable to donation h cause de mort characterization. Moreover, for the
sake of consistency, the suggested characterization appears preferable to
the court's contractual designation treatment.
An additional type of benefit plan not affected by the recent legislabe inordinately cumbersome, if at all possible, to draft a form that would comply
with the testamentary form requirements of every state involved.
130. Id., aiding LA. R.S. 23:651(1) (Supp. 1976). The provision further defines
"plan" as "any arrangement, agreement, contract, plan, system or trust whereby a
participant acquires an enforceable right to retirement income where payment is
deferred until the termination of employment or thereafter ....
131. Id. The Employee Retirement Income System Act (ERISA) is found in 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1974).
132 La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:652(4) (Supp. 1976).
133. Official Revision Comments to La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S.
23:652 (Supp. 1976).
134. See id. ("Moreover, there are compelling reasons why plan benefits should

not be treated as assets of the succession. To include plan benefits in the succession
would subject them to the expense and delays of administration, and then to federal

estate taxes and Louisiana inheritance taxes, from which benefits payable to a
named beneficiary other than the succession are presently exempt.").
135. La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:652(4) (Supp. 1976): "The
designation form [of a deferred compensation plan] shall remain in effect until
revoked, terminated, amended or modified as provided by the plan."
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tion is the statutorily based teacher's retirement system.' 36 Similarly to its
treatment of the deferred benefit plan in T. L. James, the supreme court
has acknowledged that a teacher's written designation, on a printed form,
of a beneficiary to receive death benefits from the teacher's retirement
system constitutes a valid gratuitous disposition, even though not in the
Code's strict donative form.' 37 The court has not had occasion to determine whether the designated beneficiary of the death benefits of the plan is
accountable to forced heirs. 138 It appears likely that the recipient would be
held so answerable, however, based on the supreme court's clear pronouncement in T. L. James that forced heirship is not subject to defeat by
the gratuitous designation of a beneficiary in a contractual benefit arrangement. 3 9 For the identical reasons urged for characterizing the deferred compensation plan as a donation a cause de mort, the assignment of
proceeds under the teacher's retirement system is likewise amenable to
donation 6 cause de mort classification; furthermore, such a uniform
classification seems clearly preferable to treatment of the assignment as an
undefined donative disposition.
Conclusion
Gratuitous designations of beneficiaries in United States Savings
Bonds, life insurance policies, annuity policies and pension benefit plans
136. Teacher's Retirement Act, LA. R.S. 17:571 et seq. (1950), as amended by
La. Acts 1976, No. 619, § 1, and La. Acts 1975, No. 339, § 1.
137. Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial, 317 So. 2d 179, 183 (La. 1975). See
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Successions
and Donations, 37 LA. L. REV. 421, 435-39 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Successions and Donations, 36 LA. L.
REV. 362, 373-74 (1976).
138. In Vi 1, the claim of the forced heir for the 16gitime was moot because the
court determined it already had been satisfied by receipt of other succession assets.
However, the court of appeal in Teachers'RetirementSystem v. Vial, 304 So. 2d 53
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), had held that death benefits under the retirement system
did not form part of the teacher's estate and inured directly to the beneficiary by the
terms of the contractual designation. This appears in full accord with the T. L.
James rationale.
139. See also the Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Successions and Donations, 37 LA. L. REV. 421, 438-39 (1976): "It would
thus appear that whether one treats the retirement benefit as additional compensation to the employee during the marriage (where contributions are made by the
employer) or as the separate estate of the employee (where the fund to be distributed consists of the contributions made by the employee under the State
Teachers' Retirement System) the end result is the same. In both, the retiree is
accountable to the non-employee spouse for one half of the benefits received, and
in both the designated beneficiary upon death is accountable to forced heirs for
their legitime."
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are recognized in Louisiana even though they do not conform to, and
originated without reference to, the Code's donative scheme. Yet, only
excessive "donations" that comport with the scheme literally are subject
to the rights of forced heirs through aggregation of assets that form the
active mass of the succession and reduction. The hiatus that apparently
results in the enforcement of the rights of a forced heir with respect to
excessive donations via non-Code gratuitous designations is subject to the
following varied treatment:
1. The courts treat the United States Savings Bond designation of
the co-ownership type as a donation inter vivos that forms part of a
decedent's estate, and that is includible in the formation of the active
mass of the succession and subject to reduction if it impinges on the
l6gitime of a forced heir. The payable-on-death beneficiary bond
designation is treated as a donation mortis causa that does not form
part of a decedent's estate; however, it is likewise deemed includible
in the fictitious collation of the mass of the succession and subject to
reduction for infringement on the 16gitime.
2. The courts and legislation treat life insurance proceeds as sui
generis, exempt from all of the Code's donative provisions and fully
immune from claim by forced heirs.
3. The courts and legislation, without attempting donative classification under the Code, treat the proceeds of an annuity policy as part
of a decedent's estate that is includible in the formation of the active
mass of the succession and subject to claim by forced heirs via
reduction.
4. Due to the fundamental nature of forced heirship, the courts,
with legislative approval, treat the proceeds of a deferred compensation plan as a valid contractual designation, subject to claim by forced
heirs. It is recognized, however, that these proceeds do not form part
of a decedent's estate.
As a result of these varied approaches, several criticisms are warranted. Judicial classification of United States Savings Bonds of the coownership type as donations inter vivos and of the payable-on-death
beneficiary type as donations mortis causa is at variance with the Code's
donative scheme, since co-ownership bond designations are revocable and
do not require authentic form or a Code-prescribed acceptance, and since
payable-on-death beneficiary bond designations do not require testamentary form. In addition, despite classification of the latter type of bond as a
donation mortis causa, the courts subject the payable-on-death beneficiary
bond designation to the formulation of the active mass of the succession,
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in disregard of the Code's reservation of the process tothe donation inter
vivos alone. Judicial and legislative characterization of life insurance
proceeds as sui generis correctly acknowledges the non-applicability to
such proceeds of the Code's donative classification, but unjustifiably
disregards the constitutional protection afforded forced heirs in Louisiana.
The courts' application to excessive gratuitous designations in annuity
contracts and pension benefit plans of the Code's donative measures that
safeguard the rights of forced heirs, without a concomitant attempt to force
the designations into classification under the Code's donative scheme,
manifests the correct conceptual approach to treatment of the donative
designations.
However, in contrast to judicial non-classification of annuity policy
proceeds and classification of benefit plan proceeds variously as contractual designations or valid gratuitous dispositions, characterization of all
gratuitous designations of beneficiaries as donations 6 cause de mort
would achieve the desired protection of forced heirs with an equally
desirable uniform conceptual approach. Like the donation 6 cause de
mort, the gratuitous designations are inter vivos in nature and have
revocability as an essential element. Moreover, in all but the instance of
the co-ownership bond designation, the designations are made in contemplation of death and the contingency of the donor's death prior to that of
the donee is crucial to their efficacy.
By virtue of a uniform donation ti cause de mort classification, it
would be patently unnecessary to classify a gratuitous designation under
the Code's stricti juris donative scheme in order to invoke the remedies
that protect the rights of forced heirs. Instead, the courts could recognize,
as has already been done with regard to proceeds of pension plans, that all
excessive donations are subject to the fundamental protection of forced
heirship irrespective of express protection under the Code. In view of the
inter vivos nature of the donation c6cause de mort, aggregation and
reduction would, by analogy, constitute appropriate enforcement mechanisms for excessive gratuitous designations.
Joseph S. Palermo, Jr.

